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This paper represents one of the first analyses of exchange rate pass-through in a dynamic
context.  It explores the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in a duopoly where firms
interact over an indefinite period of time.  In these circumstances there exists an incentive for
the duopolists to tacitly collude.  The paper investigates the manner in which exchange rate
changes influence the inherent tension that exists between the incentives to collude and
compete.  It is shown that the sign and degree of exchange rate pass-through depends
critically upon: the expected duration of a change in the exchange rate and the relative
competitive strengths of the firms.  The predictions of the model closely accord with the
empirical evidence on exchange rate pass-through.
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The responsiveness of import prices to fluctuations in the exchange rate is an issue
which has generated considerable interest in recent years.  Much of this literature has
been motivated by the observation that changes in the exchange rate do not pass-
through in to prices.  For instance, a number of empirical studies have discovered that
the degree of exchange rate pass-through in to prices depends on both the source and
the destination of exports.  Thus, in a widely quoted study Knetter (1989) found that
US exporters tended to adjust prices in a manner which amplified the effects of
exchange rate variations on local currency prices, while German export prices were
varied in a way which stabilized the local currency price in the destination market
i.
It has frequently been suggested that this asymmetry in the pattern of pricing
across destination markets may be indicative of tacitly collusive pricing behavior
ii.
While there are a profusion of theoretical models which seek to explain incomplete
exchange rate pass-through, there have been no attempts to formally explore this
phenomenon in the context of a tacitly collusive oligopoly.  Accordingly, this paper
seeks to augment the existing literature by investigating the impact of exchange rate
variations in an infinitely repeated supergame.
The analysis is based on a simple price setting duopoly with a domestic firm
and a foreign rival who produce a differentiated product and compete over an
indefinite period of time.  It is widely recognised that when firms interact over an
infinite horizon, then at least some degree of tacit collusion is rendered individually
rational (Friedman, 1989).  However, collusion gives rise to the familiar problem that
each firm has an incentive to defect, given that its rival abides by the collusive
agreement.  To deter such defection we assume that firms employ the familiar “grim
trigger strategy” to deter cheating.  Specifically, a firm abandons collusion and reverts
to the noncooperative one-shot Nash equilibrium when its rival defects.
iii  The
duopolists will have no incentive to defect if the future losses brought about by
dissolution of the tacitly collusive agreement exceed the immediate gains from
defection.4
In what follows we focus upon the sign of exchange rate pass-through to prices
in the constrained tacitly collusive equilibria.
iv  It is demonstrated that the response of
prices to variations in the exchange rate depends crucially upon two factors: the
expected duration of a change in the exchange rate, and the relative competitiveness
of the foreign and domestic firms.
To see why, consider a permanent depreciation of the exchange rate.  Ceteris
paribus, this lowers the future collusive profits accruing to the foreign firm and hence
diminishes its incentive to collude.  Thus, a permanent depreciation of the exchange
rate induces the foreign firm to compete more aggressively and this leads to an
equilibrium with lower prices.
Exchange rate variations are, however, typically transitory in nature.  Hence,
Section 4 explores the impact of random fluctuations in the exchange rate.  It is
demonstrated that if exchange rate changes are expected to be random, then a
depreciation raises the foreign firm’s incentive to collude. This occurs because a
depreciation lowers the current gains accruing to the firm from defection.  On the
other hand, by colluding the firm expects to earn higher future collusive profits when
the exchange rate appreciates.  It follows that the foreign firm has a greater incentive
to collude during a temporary depreciation.  Thus, if the foreign firm is the dominant
competitor, a temporary depreciation provides it with an incentive to establish a more
collusive equilibrium with higher prices.  Conversely, when the domestic firm is the
more aggressive competitor, a depreciation by weakening the position of the foreign
rival, allows the domestic firm to establish a more competitive equilibrium with lower
prices. Thus, the response of prices to exchange rate movements is found to depend
not only on the expected duration of the change, but also the relative competitiveness
of the firms.
The role of market structure in determining pass -through has long been
recognised in the theoretical literature.  For instance, Fisher (1989a) demonstrated that
in a one-shot homogenous duopoly the extent and direction of pass-through depends
critically upon the relative market structure of the domestic and foreign industries.  It5
is shown that a depreciation of the exchange rate will lead to a greater increase in
prices if the domestic industry is highly monopolised relative to the foreign rivals.
This is because firms use their market power to set prices when the exchange rate
moves in their favour.  The results in this paper suggest that in an infinitely repeated
game the outcome is somewhat more complicated and depends on both relative
market power and the duration of the exchange rate change.
2.     The Model
The analysis is based on a simple model with two firms labeled F and H who produce
a differentiated product.  Firm H is assumed to be a domestic firm and F a spatially
separated rival located in a foreign country.  It is supposed that the duopolists compete
in country H, using prices as the strategic variable.  The price of the domestic firm’s
product in home currency units is denoted pH and that of the foreign rival also
denominated in country H’s currency, is pF.  The demand function for firm i in each
period is given by:
qi = qi(pH, pF)             (i = H, F)  (1a)
where pi is the price set by firm i (i =H,F) denominated in the currency of the
domestic country H.
We assume that the demand function qi is bounded and continuous in pi and pj
with:
 ∂ qi/∂ pi < 0;    ∂ qi/∂ pj > 0   and    ∂ qi/∂ pi  >  ∂ qi/∂ pj (1b)
These conditions imply that the goods produced are imperfect substitutes, with the
own price effects on demand exceeding the cross price effects.
For simplicity it is supposed that production costs are zero.  Thus, the profit
function of firm H is given by:
Π HH H pq = (2a)
Similarly the profit function of firm F, denominated in country H’s currency units, is:
Π FF F pq = ( ) (2b)
In contrast, the profits of firm F in its own currency is:6
Π FF F pq e = () / (2c)
where: e is the exchange rate defined as units of home currency per unit of foreign
exchange.
It is further supposed that the profit functions are single peaked in pi and pj in
the relevant range.  Finally, we assume that:
(∂∂ ∂
2Π ii j pp /)  >  0   ( 3 a )
(∂∂ ∂
2Π ii j pp /)  +  ∂∂ qp ii /  > 0  (3b)
Condition (3a) asserts that prices are strategic complements (Bulow et al, 1985) so
that the best response curves are positively sloped.  In contrast, (3b) is the dual of the
familiar “Hahn condition” which is evoked to ensure stability of the one-shot Nash
equilibrium (Shapiro, 1990).
The solution of the one-shot price setting game is obtained by differentiating
the profit functions in (2a) and (2c) and solving the first order conditions:
 q i  + pi (∂ qi/∂ pi)  = 0 (i = H, F) (4)
Equation (4) implicitly defines each firm's best response function.  Solving yields the
one shot Nash equilibrium prices and profits  denoted pi
N
i
N  and Π  respectively (i = H,
F).
It is supposed that the firms interact over an indefinite period of time and
therefore have an incentive to tacitly collude by restricting output levels (see Friedman
(1989)). For completeness we define the joint profit maximising outcome.  The most





c =  which maximise
joint collusive profits
v.  That is:
~ p
cc
FH ∈≡ +  Argmax ΠΠΠ  (5a)
where: superscript C is used to denote collusion.
Collusion, however, gives rise to the familiar problem that each firm has an
incentive to defect when its rival sets the collusive price.  More formally, suppose that
firm i (i = H, F) sets some collusive price p p i
c
i
N > .  Then its rival j ≠  i maximizes its
one period profits by defecting and producing at a price:
pH







c pq p p ≡ ( , ,)       for j = H and i = F  (5b)7
pF







D pq p p e ≡ ( , ) /    for j = F and i = H (5c)
where: superscript D denotes defection and C collusion.
As is well established in the literature, such defection can be deterred by
adopting a credible threat of future retaliation.  We assume that firms adopt the
familiar "grim trigger strategy" to deter cheating.  Specifically, this requires that both
firms set some tacitly collusive price so long as there is no defection.  However, if any
firm defects, the collusive agreement is abandoned and all firms revert to the one-shot
Nash equilibrium price.  For collusion to be feasible the following incentive
compatibility constraint must hold for each firm:












()    (i = H, F) (6a)
where: δ  is the discount factor, Π i















c pq p p e ≡ ( , ) /  are the collusive profits of firm’s H, and F respectively and
Π i
N is one-shot Nash equilibrium profits.
The left hand side of (6a) represents the one period gains from defection, while
the right hand side defines the net present value of future collusive profits foregone
when the punishment is delivered and the firms revert to the one-shot Nash
equilibrium.  Recall that firm F’s profits are denominated in the foreign currency and
are thus directly affected by exchange rate variations, while those of firm H are not.
This therefore introduces an asymmetry in the payoffs from tacit collusion, even when
both firms confront identical cost and demand conditions.  Accordingly, solving
equation (6a) for δ  we define a function which captures the relative gains from
defection:











N (,, )( ) / ( ) ≡− − ΠΠ ΠΠ      (i = H, F) (6b)
Observe that if the prevailing discount factor δ  ≥  ap pe iH
C
F
C ( , , )  then the incentive
compatibility constraint in (6a) is satisfied, so that firm i has no incentive to defect.
Conversely, if δ  < a p p e iH
C
F
C ( , , )  the payoffs from defection exceed the discounted
profits from collusion so that defection is the individually rational strategy for firm i.
It follows, that a p p e iH
C
F
C ( , , )  defines the threshold  level of the discount factor at8
which tacit collusion is sustainable.  Specifically, firm i has an incentive to collude, if
and only if, the prevailing discount factor δ  ∈  [a p p e iH
C
F
C (,, ) , 1 ] .
Equations (2a) and (2c) reveal that ceteris paribus firm F’s profits are directly
influenced by exchange rate changes, while those of firm H are not.  To take account
of the differential impact of exchange rates on the firms’ incentives to collude we












C (,, * ) (,, * ) = (6c)
When (6c) holds, then at the prevailing exchange rate e* the two firms are symmetric
in the sense that they both have the same incentive to collude.
vi  If instead, the







C (,, ) (,, ) >  (for e ≠ e*) then, ceteris
paribus, firm H has a greater incentive to collude than its rival F.  This is because
higher levels of ai(ppe H
C
F
C ,, ) correspond to increases in the incentive to defect.  Thus,








C (,, ) (,, ) <  (for e ≠ e*) then firm F has a greater incentive to
collude than its rival H.  Hence, H is the more aggressive competitor.  Clearly, tacit
collusion is feasible if and only if the prevailing discount rate satisfies:







C (,, ) ,(,, ) )
When condition (6d) holds the payoffs to each firm from collusion are at least as great
as the gains from defection.  Tacit collusion is therefore sustainable.
In what follows, we assume that given an exogenously determined exchange
rate and discount factor, each firm chooses a price which is consistent with the
absence of defection by its rival.  This implies that firm i's (i = H, F) collusive price is



















( )    (i = H,F) and  ( i ≠  j)9
In what follows we focus on cases of constrained collusion in which the joint
profit maximising price level cannot be simultaneously sustained by both firms.  This
implies that the incentive compatibility constraint in (7) binds in equilibrium for at
least one firm.
viii  The resulting equilibria are neither as collusive as the joint profit
maximising solution, nor as competitive as the one-shot Nash equilibrium.  While
there are many other equilibria in this model, we deal only with the properties of
equilibria where the constraint binds on at least one firm.
For future reference we outline a property of the incentive compatibility
constraint which is used extensively in what follows.  The proof is relegated to the
Appendix.
Let pi
c (i = H, F) denote the solution to the constrained maximisation problem



















 > 0   (i = H, F) and (i ≠  j)
Lemma 1 informs us that when a firm raises its collusive price level then this
increases its rival's incentive to defect.  In particular, the rival’s defection profits rise
more rapidly than do its collusive profits.  This result suggests that a firm can reduce
its rival's incentive to defect by simply lowering its own collusive price.  Hence, in
setting its own collusive price each firm must ensure that its rival also has an incentive
to collude.  This relationship explains the structure of the maximisation problem
outlined in equation (7), where firm i sets a price to maximise collusive profits,
subject to the constraint that the rival does not defect.
3.      Permanent Changes in the Exchange Rate
Having established the basic properties of the model we now investigate the impact of
a permanent shift in the exchange rate.  We begin by exploring the effect of changes
in the exchange rate on the relative incentives of the firms to collude.10
Consider a permanent depreciation of the exchange rate.  The profit functions
in equation (2a) and (2c) reveal that at given prices a depreciation of the exchange rate
lowers the profits accruing to firm F, but has no direct impact on the profits of the
domestic firm H.  Moreover, it can be shown that a permanent depreciation of the
exchange rate decreases the scope for earning future collusive profits and makes
defection relatively more attractive than collusion for firm F.  This result is
summarised with greater accuracy in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2:  At given collusive prices (,) pp H
c
F
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N .  However, by equation (6b) we know that collusion is






















      ∀∈ δ [( ,, ) , ] appe FH
C
F
C 1 . QED.
Intuitively, this result may be explained as follows.  Recall that equation (6b)
reveals that firm F will collude only if it cares sufficiently about future collusive
profits.  This in turn implies that future earnings are given more weight than current
profits in the incentive compatibility constraint.  It follows that in this case a
depreciation of the exchange rate, by decreasing the scope for earning future profits,
makes collusion less attractive for firm F.
An immediate implication of Lemma 2 is that a depreciation of the exchange
rate, by lowering the foreign firm’s payoffs from collusion, raises the critical level of
the discount rate at which F is willing to collude.  A depreciation therefore makes the
foreign firm a more aggressive competitor relative to its domestic rival.  Using
Lemma 2 and the definition of e* in equation (6c) it immediately follows that:11







C (,, ) (,, * ) ≥  (8a)







C (,, ) (,, * ) < (8b)
Having described the effects of a change in e on the incentive to collude, we








C (,, ) ( ) (,, * ) ≥< .
Consider first the special case when both firms are initially in a symmetric







C (,, * ) (,, * ) = .
Observe that in this case at the prevailing exchange rate the firms have the same
relative incentive to collude.  The equilibrium outcome is given by the solution to the
maximisation problem defined in equation (7) with the constraint binding on each
firm. That is, each firm i (i= H, F), (i ≠  j) maximizes profits, subject to the satisfaction
of the incentive compatibility constraint of its rival.  This in turn yields a mapping
from firm i’s price into firm j’s price and vice-versa.  The equilibrium is then defined
by the pair of collusive prices that are the fixed point of the two mappings.  In the
Appendix we solve the system and demonstrate that the impact of a depreciation on






























F =− ΦΦ ΦΦ  > 0
Equations (9a) and (9b) reveal that the price responses are asymmetric, with
the foreign firm lowering its price in response to an exchange rate depreciation, while
the domestic rival increases price.  This outcome can be seen to arise from Lemma 2
which reveals that a depreciation of the exchange rate lowers the foreign firm’s
payoffs from collusion and therefore makes defection more attractive.  If defection is
to be prevented then the foreign firm’s collusive payoffs must be increased.12
Equations (9a) and (9b) indicate that this is achieved through an increase in the
foreign firm’s market share and collusive profits.
x
Consider next the case when the prevailing discount rate is given by







c ( , , ) ( , , ).  Recall that higher values of ai(p p e H
c
F
c , , ) reflect a
greater incentive to defect, hence in this equilibrium the domestic firm has less







c ( , , ) firm H’s incentive compatibility constraint is just satisfied with
equality, while that of firm F’s holds with slack.  Equilibrium prices are thus




































Since the incentive compatibility constraint of firm F holds with slack, marginal










This result reflects the fact that at given prices a depreciation lowers the profits
of the foreign firm.  However, since the domestic firm is the more aggressive
competitor, the foreign rival cannot recoup its profits by unilaterally varying its price,
since this could induce defection and the dissolution of the tacitly collusive
agreement.  The foreign firm is therefore compelled to leave its price unchanged and
passively absorb the depreciation in lower profit margins.







c ( , , ) ( , , ).  In this case firm H’s
incentive compatibility constraint holds with slack, while firm F’s constraint is just13
satisfied with equality.  It follows that the domestic firm now has a greater incentive


































F VV =− <0
Intuitively, this result reflects the property described in Lemma 1.  A
permanent depreciation lowers the collusive payoffs accruing to the more aggressive
foreign firm and increases the incentive to defect.  From Lemma 1 we know that this
greater incentive to defect can be curtailed by lowering collusive prices.  Thus, a less
collusive equilibrium emerges with lower prices.
Overall these results indicate that the impact of a permanent depreciation of
the exchange rate on oligopolistic prices depends critically on the rival firms’ relative
incentive to collude.  The analysis suggests that export price variations which
counteract permanent exchange rate movements are indicative of a more aggressive
foreign firm confronting a weaker domestic rival in an infinitely repeated supergame.
4.    Temporary Fluctuations in the Exchange Rate
The analysis in the previous section was based on the unrealistic assumption that
exchange rate movements are permanent.  Exchange rate variations are, however,
typically transitory in nature. While the precise statistical properties of exchange rate
fluctuations have been the subject of considerable empirical research, there is a
substantial body of literature which suggests that exchange rates tend to follow a
random walk (Frankel and Rose, 1995).  Accordingly, in this Section we accept as a
stylised fact that exchange rate fluctuations are random and explore the consequences
on oligopolistic pricing behavior.
Variations in the exchange rate are incorporated into the model by assuming
that the exchange rate e has domain [,] ee with density function f(e) and cumulative
distribution function F(e).
xi  We assume that these fluctuations are identically and14
independently distributed over time.  The exchange rate process is thus not a
martingale and the expected value of the exchange rate in any future period is
independent of the current realisation.  It is therefore impossible to predict the future
level on the basis of past levels of the exchange rate.
As in the previous Section, this implies that the profit function of firm H is not
directly affected by the exchange rate.  However, firm F's profits are influenced by
exchange rate changes so that it becomes necessary to alter the incentive compatibility
constraints to take account of expected future changes in the exchange rate.
Specifically, the rewards to firm F from defection in any period depend on the current
realisation of e, while the punishments depend on expected future realisations of e.

















The left hand side of (13a) describes the current rewards from defection.  Since firm
F’s profits depend on the prevailing exchange rate, the gains from deviation are
influenced by the current level of the exchange rate.
xii  In contrast, the right hand side
describes the expected future loss from the punishment which depends on expected
future changes in the exchange rate.  Note that by assumption the expected future
change in the exchange rate is independent of its current realisation.
In contrast, firm H’s incentive compatibility constraint is given by:















(( () ) ) (13b)
The left hand side of equation (13b) reflects the fact that at given prices firm H’s
profits are unaffected by the exchange rate.  However,  H’s future expected collusive
profits may vary with e, if its rival’s prices fluctuate with the exchange rate.  Thus, on
the right hand side future expected collusive profits are allowed to vary with expected
changes in the exchange rate.
xiii
We begin by determining the impact of a change in the exchange rate on firm
F’s incentive to collude.  Lemma 3 reveals that a depreciation of the exchange rate15
lowers the foreign firm’s incentive to defect and therefore makes collusion more
attractive
xiv.
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Suppose that the exchange rate is at some level e at which F’s incentive compatibility
constraint binds at given collusive prices (pp H
c
F
c , ).  Define F’s incentive compatibility


























Consider a depreciation of the exchange rate to some level ee > .  Holding collusive prices
at their given levels (pp H
c
F






















Suppose that Lemma 3 is not true, this then implies that a depreciation of the exchange raises




















c ppe ppe (,, ) ; (,, )  in the above equation, using (2b) and
rearranging:















g pq p p = (,)   (g = D, C)
Since () ΠΠ F
D
F
C −  > 0 by construction, it follows that (I) is satisfied iff:
11
e e
> .  This yields










c ppe ppe (,, ) (,, ) −< 0 so that a depreciation of the exchange rate lowers the
incentive to defect. QED.
Intuitively, this ocurs because a depreciation of the exchange rate lowers the
current rewards from defection, but has no impact on the expected cost of the
punishment.  Thus, the expected future loss from the punishment is fixed, while the16
gains from deviation decline as the exchange rate depreciates.  It follows that firm F
has a greater incentive to collude in periods in which the exchange rate depreciates.
xv
We begin by investigating the impact of a depreciation when the firms are







c (,, ) (,, )
xvi.  The
equilibrium outcome is given by the solution to the maximisation problem with the
incentive compatibility constraint binding on each firm.  In the Appendix it is shown
that the derivatives cannot be signed. This occurs because a depreciation of the
exchange rate has two conflicting effects in this equilibrium.  On the one hand, from
Lemma 3 we know that a depreciation increases firm F’s incentive to collude and
therefore provides it with an incentive to establish a more collusive equilibrium with
higher prices.  However, since the incentive compatibility constraint binds on H, a
price increase may also induce a defection and may therefore not be sustainable.
Hence, the outcome is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model.







c ( , , ) ( , , ).  This implies
that firm F’s incentive compatibility constraint holds with slack, while firm H’s
constraint is just satisfied with equality.  Thus, relative to its foreign rival the domestic
firm is the more aggressive competitor with less incentive to collude.  Following the
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H VV =−> 0
In this equilibrium, the competitive advantage of the domestic firm is reinforced by a
depreciation of the exchange rate and this leads to an equilibrium with lower prices.







c ( , , ) ( , , ).  In this case firm H’s
incentive compatibility constraint holds with slack, while that of firm F’s is just



































F VV =− <0
A depreciation of the exchange rate makes collusion more attractive for the foreign
firm so that it raises its price.  The weaker domestic firm follows its lead and also
increases its price.
In contrast to the conclusions of Section 3 these results suggest  that when a
more aggressive foreign firm confronts a less competitive domestic rival the price set
tends to amplify temporary exchange rate movements.  Conversely, when the
domestic firm is the more aggressive competitor, the foreign firm has an incentive to
set prices which counteract temporary fluctuations in the exchange rate.  These
findings appear to confirm Knetter’s (op cit) observation that price stabilisation of
German exports in US markets reflects the fact that the “....number of competing
firms faced by German exporters is greater in the US than in other destination
markets.”  Similarly, the empirical evidence presented by Mann (1986) also suggests
that US export prices tend to amplify currency movements.  The results outlined here
indicate that this is likely to occur either if US firms are the dominant players or
compete more aggressively in overseas markets than their foreign rivals.
5. A Numerical Example
In this section we provide a simple numerical example of the equilibria based
on a linear demand function of the form:
qp p ii j =− + 10 5 .     (i = H, F;   i ≠  j) (16)
where: pi, pj are prices denominated in country H’s currency.
As in earlier sections, production costs are assumed to be zero.   Solving for








N e == 0445 0445 .; . /     (17b)18
If a firm tacitly colludes and sets a price p p i
C
i
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δ
δ (. ) ( . )  ( 1 9 b )
In what follows we assume that the discount rate is 5%.
xvii  Observe that the
incentive compatibility constraints in (19a) and (19b) are symmetric when e* = e =1.







c (,, ) (,, ) >  so that firm H is the more
aggressive competitor with a greater incentive to defect and the equilibrium is defined
in equation (10).  Conversely, when e > e* = 1 then a p p e HH
c
F
c (,, )   < appe FH
c
F
c (,, ) ,
firm F has less incentive to collude than H and the effect of exchange rate changes is
defined in equation (7).
The equilibrium outcomes are summarised in Figure 1.  When e = 1, the equilibrium
is symmetric and defined by equation (9) which yields collusive prices p p H
C
F
C =  =
1.297 and profits ΠΠ H
C
F
C =  = 0.46.
 xviii  Conversely, when e > 1 the incentive
compatibility constraint binds on firm F in equilibrium.  In this equilibrium if the
exchange rate depreciates beyond e = 1.4 collusion is no longer feasible as the profits
that firm F earns in the one-shot noncollusive Nash equilibrium exceed those under
collusion.  This outcome reflects the fact that a depreciation makes defection more
attractive for firm F.  Thus, with a sufficiently large depreciation the incentive to
collude eventually disappears.  When e < 1 the equilibrium is defined by equation (10)
where firm H is the more aggressive competitor with less incentive to collude.  Since
changes in the exchange rate have no direct impact on firm H, who is the stronger
competitor, firm F is unable to vary its price in response to exchange rate changes.
Thus, as equation (11) reveals collusive prices remain unchanged in this region.19
Figure 1 here
Consider next random fluctuations in the exchange rate.  For computational
ease we focus upon a highly simplified exchange rate process which captures the main
features of the model outlined in Section 4.  Thus, it is assumed that the exchange rate
fluctuates randomly between two discrete states e1 and e2.  It is further supposed that
state e1  occurs with some probability α  < 1 and e2 eventuates with probability (1 - α ).
Without loss of generality it is assumed that the exchange rate is initially in state e1,



































































δ (. ) ( . ) (20b)
For purposes of comparison with the results in Figure 1 we begin by
considering the special symmetric equilibrium when e1 = e2 = 1 and the firms have the
same incentive to collude.  Lemma 3 reveals that with random fluctuations in the
exchange rate, a depreciation raises firm F’s incentive to collude.  Hence if e1 > 1 then
firm H is the more aggressive competitor, while e1 < 1 corresponds to the case where
firm F is the more aggressive competitor.  The resulting equilibrium prices and profits
are summarised in Figure 2.
 Figure 2 here
Since depreciations of the exchange rate improve firm H’s competitive
position, the Figure reveals that when e1 > 1 the domestic firm earns higher profits
than its foreign rival in the collusive equilibrium.  Moreover, firm F’s one-shot Nash20
equilibrium profits exceed profits under tacit collusion when e1 < 0.4.  This result
simply reflects the fact that an appreciation of the exchange rate erodes the incentive
to collude.
Overall these results suggest that tacit collusion is harder to sustain when large
movements of the exchange rate lower the foreign firm’s incentive to collude.  With
permanent changes of the exchange rate, collusion is made more difficult following a
large depreciation, while with temporary fluctuations tacit collusion breaks down if
there is a substantial appreciation of the exchange rate.  More generally, however, the
numerical results reveal that the price responses depend critically upon the relative
competitive strengths of the domestic and foreign firms.
6.    Conclusions
The results obtained in this paper reveal that when firms interact over an
indefinite period of time then the impact of a change in the exchange rate depends
critically upon two factors: the expected duration of the change and the relative
incentives of the firms to collude (compete).  When the domestic firm is the more
aggressive competitor and a depreciation is expected to be temporary , then export
prices tend to be adjusted in a manner which counteract currency movements.  This
outcome suggests the need for future empirical research to take further account of
both the relative market power of firms in tradable goods markets and the anticipated
duration of a change in the exchange rate.  Moreover, it should be noted that in
keeping with the existing literature the analysis is based on a partial equilibrium
model in which monetary phenomena (nominal exchange rate movements) have real
effects. There is clearly a need  to incorporate such a model into a more general
macroeconomic framework.
While the results in this paper are based on a price setting supergame, the
model can be easily reinterpreted in terms of quantity competition.  In this case
collusion is supported by reversion to the Cournot equilibrium.  It can be verified that21
the effect of exchange rate changes on profits is qualitatively the same as that outlined










 > 0   (i = H, F) and (i ≠  j)
Proof:
Suppose that Lemma 1 is not true.  Then ∂Φ
j/∂ pi
c≤ 0 which implies that an increase in pi
c
does not raise the gains from defection.  Moreover, since  pi
c
i
c p < ~  this increases Π
C without
violating the constraint.  This, however, contradicts the hypothesis that pi
c solves the
maximisation problem when the constraint binds.  Hence, if pi
c is a solution to the
constrained maximisation problem then: ∂Φ
j /
 ∂ pi
c > 0.  Q.E.D.
Equation 9





















where: subscripts on Φ




c p =∂ Φ ∂ /  = - ( / ( ))( / ) δδ ∂ Π ∂ ii i
C
i
C p 1−  > 0     (i = H, F) (Since







C ∈ max ( , ) Π  and pp i
c
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D >  then ∂Π ∂i
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c p =∂ Φ ∂ /  > 0 (i = H, F) by Lemma 1
Φ e
ii e =∂ Φ ∂ /  > 0  (i = F) by Lemma 2







F =− ΦΦ ΦΦ  > 0 (since it is easily verified that by (1b) own







H >> ;) .
Solving (A1) yields equations (9a) and (9b) in the text.
Equation 12




















Note that ∂∂ Ve
F /  = 0.  Since the constraint binds firm H’s most collusive sustainable price














By Lemma 2 ∂Φ ∂
























F < 0 from the second order conditions, and by (3b) VH








F VV =− < 0.  Solving (A4) yields (12a) and (12b).23
















(( ) ) (A5)































Proof that with temporary changes when e= e* then  dpi/de 
<
> 0 (i = H,F):
Following the procedure outlined above, differentiation of the incentive compatibility


































































































































































F VV =−  < 0 .  Solving gives (16a and b) in the text.24
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ii  A similar result is also reported in Mann (1986) who studied the effect of dollar appreciations
and depreciations on US export margins.
ii   See Knetter (op cit),  Fisher (1989b)
iii  In this model assumptions about the profit function ensure that there is a unique one shot Nash
equilibrium.
iv  There are other equilibria of the supergame.  Attention is restricted to constrained collusive
equilibria since this allows us to identify the manner in which marginal changes in the exchange rate
influence prices.
v  The joint profit maximising prices are defined as those that would be set by a monopolist
producing the differentiated products. Hence prices are set to maximise the combined profits of the two
firms.
vi  The precise relationship between ai and e depends upon the impact of e on the incentive
compatibility constraints.  This in turn depends on expected changes in e.  These matters are discussed
in further detail in the following sections.
vii  This approach to modeling constrained collusive equilibria has been widely adopted in the
literature.  Examples include  Davidson and Martin (1985), Damania (1994) amongst others.  The
rationale underlying this approach follows from Lemma 1 and is explained later in this Section.
viii  In the parlance of Friedman (1989) this is termed a “balanced temptation equilibrium”.
ix  Note that we use the fact that since Π F = pFqF/e; then ∂Π F/∂ e = - pFqF/e
2 = -Π F/e.
x  Firm F’s market share increases because the domestic firm raises its price while the foreign
firm’s price declines.
xi  It is, of course, implicitly assumed here that the support of e is a positive subset of real
numbers.




F pq e = ( ) / ,   (g = C, D).
xiii  In contrast, from equation (4) we know that in the one-shot Nash equilibrium, prices are
independent of the exchange rate and hence Π H
N  is unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations.
xv  This result is analogous to that of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) where the incentive to defect
is greatest in periods of high demand.
xvi  As in the previous section ai(.) is the relative incentive to defect, and is derived by rearranging
the incentive compatibility constraints.
xvii  This corresponds to a discount factor of 0.952.
xviii  As is well known the incentive compatibility constraint in a constrained symmetric equilibrium
reduces to a quadratic, with one solution at the one-shot Nash equilibrium price and the other solution
at the higher collusive price.
xix  All results for the case of quantity competition are available from the author upon request.